And does that mean that the provider of the meek server could perform confirmation attacks on users browsing sites hosted by the same provider? Yes, that is right. It is good to know the risks, because there are sometimes tradeoffs between censorship resistance and anonymity.
If the destination web site is also hosted on the CDN, then the CDN gets to see both entry and exit traffic and has a better chance of doing a confirmation attack. This kind of information is very helpful in enabling Tor users to make informed decisions about what kind of bridges to use, and how to use them. How can I help the Tor network more at the moment? By becoming a bridge, or by becoming a middle relay?
The FAQ says:. So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay. If you set up a bridge, be sure to enable a pluggable transport. Do any sites have stats on the average bandwidth of a bridge vs a middle relay? PS: metrics. The graph Advertised bandwidth distribution shows how much bandwidth relays report seeing "advertised bandwidth".
I guess it is difficult to collect data on bridges due to their secretive nature. Torproject official site is blocked in China. We need to download Tor browser from Github or some mirror sites. When you are using meek, it is [ The tradeoff with the Meek is understood. But what if an adversary runs multiple Tor entry and exit nodes in one or even multiple CDNs that it has access to? What if an adversary runs multiple Tor entry and exit nodes in one or even multiple CDNs?
When you use meek, your bridge which acts as your guard is fixed: for meek-azure it is this one and for meek-amazon it is this one. If you set up your own meek service , you can point it at any bridge you want, and it will always use the one you configured. The additional hazard to anonymity posed by meek is not that an adversary can run lots of bridges and exits and hope to get lucky.
That hazard exists regardless. The additional hazard is rather that the CDN itself may be malicious or collude with the adversary. When using a normal bridge, a malicious or colluding bridge can help deanonymize you; the risk is more acute for meek only because CDNs also tend to be popular destinations for web traffic. Thanks for answering. To rephrase:. If i understand the question correctly, this is more or less what happened during the "CMU attack".
After the attack was discovered Tor was patched to stricten the criteria on becoming eligible to be a guard node. One of these criteria was that guard nodes could not be hosted in IP space known to belong to large CDNs and hosting providers.
Overall they made it harder to become a guard node; see the Tor blog post about the CMU attack. I am unsure if this affected bridges though. So if bridge nodes are not held to the same criteria, then theoretically an attack like you mentioned would be possible, but it would only affect bridge users, not regular Tor users. Tor also attempts to select nodes from three different subnets and three different "families" nodes operated by the same organization are called a "family" , but the collusion problem is really outside the scope of Tor, and is not really a technical problem at all.
They had discovered a flaw in the Tor protocol that enabled traffic confirmation, but they needed to run a large number of guard and HSDir nodes in order to exploit it. I think I was confused by your reference to cloud servers and CDNs. Cloud services may make it cheaper and easier to run a large number of services, but the fundamental attack is the same no matter where the servers are. There are some mitigations in place against Sybil attacks in Tor. They have a program called sybilhunter that looks for similarities among relays that may indicate they have the same operator—being hosted on the same cloud service is one clue, but there are others such as uptime, operating system, and nickname.
Many enthusiastic Tor supporters are wondering why Tor Project has not endorsed the petition to pardon the whistleblower and true American hero Edward Snowden. I hope you will consider doing that without delay, or at least explaining such a curious omission if you feel you cannot join us.
By the time this comment is posted if it ever is , the event may have ended, but Edward Snowden just tweeted that he will be chatting online around noon EST 14 Dec It is hard to give a short answer to the question "should I use pluggable transports even if I am not blocked from Tor? To answer your first question, yes, your ISP or some other eavesdropper can tell that you are using Tor, even if they cannot tell what you are using Tor for.
That is, you may be surveilled even if you are not censored. An eavesdropper can tell you are using Tor in a number of ways. Ordinary Tor relays not bridges are all published in the network status consensus along with their IP addresses. The eavesdropper can simply look for connections to IP addresses that are listed in the consensus. Alternatively, the eavesdropper could look for the particular way that Tor uses TLS in network connections. Pluggable transports make it harder to identify that you are using Tor, but there are a number of issues to be aware of.
For better security, you should use a secret bridge from bridges. You are using a default bridge if you selected "Connect with a provided bridge" rather than pasting in your own bridge information. There are only a few dozen default bridges, and their IP addresses are listed in the Tor Browser source code. This is good enough to fool naive censors, but it would be easy for an eavesdropper to make a list of everyone who connects to one of the default bridges.
The risk of being detected as a Tor user is less if you are using a secret bridge. Besides the consideration about default bridges, there is improving research on identifying the use of Tor even when pluggable transports are used.
For example, see this paper from Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation. They had some success in identifying obfs4, fte, and meek, using a classifier trained on a large sample of traffic. It is thought that national censors are not yet using this kind of classifier, but they will get better over time.
If you are running meek for yourself, please try to set up your own instance on App Engine —it only takes a Google Account and you can use 1 GB per day without paying. People are working on pluggable transport designs that may offer better covertness. If you like reading about censorship research, you should take a look at CensorBib , a list of censorship-related research papers.
If that was produced by pasting text in Mandarin into Google translate, I fear something may have gone wrong. These documents make it clear that these easily tapped communication channels are among their most lucrative sources of information. Прямая ссылка на Hydra через Tor Анонимайзер сохраните себе. По этой ссылке сайт Hydra Onion всегда доступен и Вы останитесь инкогнито. Так что такое анонимайзер и для чего он нужен? Основная задача тор анонимайзера, как и любых других анонимайзеров это скрыть свои личные данные.
Например, такие как ip адрес, местоположение и т. Благодаря использованию прокси-сервера, интернет трафик пользователя сначала идет на прокси сервер, а затем на посещаемую web страницу и так же обратно. Таким образом посещаемый пользователем ресурс видит данные прокси-сервера, а не самого пользователя. Вследствие подмены данных о пользователе, анонимайзер получил полезный "побочный эффект" - это обход блокировок сайтов. Если сайт заблокировали на территории РФ, то достаточно использовать прокси-сервер любой другой страны, где сайт не попадает под запрет.
Итак, что же такое анонимаезер? Это наш защитник, в прямом смысле этого слова, он помагает не нарушать наши права и свободу!
Pluggable Transports PT transform the Tor traffic flow between the client and the bridge. This way, censors who monitor traffic between the client and the bridge will see innocent-looking transformed traffic instead of the actual Tor traffic. External programs can talk to Tor clients and Tor bridges using the pluggable transport API , to make it easier to build interoperable programs. If connections to the Tor network are being blocked by your ISP or country, follow these instructions:.
Anyone can set up a PT bridge server and help provide bandwidth to users who needs it. Once you set up a transport type, your bridge will automatically advertise support for the transport in its descriptor. We are asking volunteers to run bridges for it. To learn how to run this transport, please visit the obfs4proxy wiki page. Go to our wiki to learn how to set up other types of PTs. Our wiki is also a great source of information, such as how to get in touch with the community , ideas for new PTs , how to help with PTs already deployed and much more.
These Pluggable Transports are currently deployed in Tor Browser, and you can start using them by downloading and using Tor Browser. Our goal is to have a wide variety of Pluggable Transport designs. You can check out a full list of Pluggables Transports here.
Tor is written for and supported by people like you. Donate today! Trademark, copyright notices, and rules for use by third parties can be found in our FAQ. Tools that Tor can use to disguise the traffic it sends out. This can be useful in situations where an Internet Service Provider ISP or other authority is actively blocking connections to the Tor network.
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